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ABSTRACT
2013 saw the National Health Service (NHS) in England severely criticized for providing
poor quality despite successive governments in the previous 15 years, establishing a range of
new institutions to improve NHS quality. This study seeks to understand the contributions of
political and organizational inﬂuences in enabling the NHS to deliver high-quality care
through exploring the experiences of two of the major new organizations established to set
standards and monitor NHS quality. We used a mixed method approach: ﬁrst a cross-sectional,
in-depth qualitative interview study and then the application of principal agent modeling
(Waterman and Meier broader framework). Ten themes were identiﬁed as inﬂuencing the
functioning of the NHS regulatory institutions: socio-political environment; governance and
accountability; external relationships; clarity of purpose; organizational reputation; leadership
and management; organizational stability; resources; organizational methods; and organizational
performance. The organizations could be easily mapped onto the framework, and their transience
between the different states could bemonitored.We concluded that differing policy objectives for
NHS quality monitoring resulted in central involvement and organizational change. This had a
disruptive effect on the ability of the NHS to monitor quality. Constant professional leadership,
both clinical and managerial, and basing decisions on best evidence, both technical and organiza-
tional, helped one institution to deliver on its remit, even within a changing political/policy
environment. Application of the Waterman–Meier framework enabled an understanding and
description of the dynamic relationship between central government and organizations in the
NHS and may predict when tensions will arise in the future. © 2016 The Authors. The Interna-
tional Journal of Health Planning and Management Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
KEY WORDS: health care quality; setting standards; health care regulation
BACKGROUND
2013 became what many commentators described as the worst year in the history of the
English National Health Service (NHS). A series of national reports were published and
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television exposés were broadcast, culminating in the Francis Enquiry (Francis, 2012),
which highlighted the poor quality of care in certain hospitals and care homes. Coalition
healthministers talked about “a poor culture” and “acceptance of themediocre” bymany
workers in the NHS (Campbell, 2013). Interestingly, much of the negative publicity con-
centrated on the NHS monitoring of quality and the responsible institution rather than
the failing hospitals themselves. Such was the outcry over the role of the Care Quality
Commission (CQC), the organization responsible for monitoring national quality at that
time, that new senior staff were appointed and a change in its approach to inspection was
announced in the House of Commons by the PrimeMinister (BBC news Stafford 2013).
Investigating the background to how this could happen, through tracing the evolution of
the organizations established to set and monitor quality standards, is important in order
to understand the genesis of quality disasters such as Stafford and to help prevent them.
Improving the efﬁciency as well as quality of the services that the NHS provides has
been a main focus for successive UK governments over the last 20years. While there
have been many approaches to “quality improvement” drawing on many disciplines,
the underlying dominant paradigm has increasingly become the setting and monitoring
of national standards through targets in various forms. It is not only in health that this
approach has been applied, as local authorities and education have also been subjected
to ever more stringent monitoring regimes. This approach has been heralded as part of
the new public management approach to managing health services, where the tension
between centralized control versus local autonomy driven by market forces has been
played out (Klein, 2010). In England the emphasis is still on a purchaser provider split
which means that the responsibility for standard-setting and quality monitoring has
been given to independent bodies often called quangos (quasi-autonomous non-gov-
ernmental organisations) in the UK. A quango is an organization to which government
has devolved power. In the United Kingdom this term covers different “arm’s-length”
government bodies, including “non-departmental public bodies, non-ministerial de-
partments, and executive agencies” (Lewis et al., 2006). This new approach to encour-
aging health care quality was outlined by the incoming Labour government in its 1997
white paper “The New NHS, modern and dependable” (Department of Health, 1997)
which created a national framework for quality based on the setting and monitoring
of national standards. To facilitate this approach a range of quangos were created and
have disappeared over the years. Two new organizations were established that were
key to the functioning of the new approach and have survived albeit in differing guises.
The Commission for Healthcare Improvement (CHI) was the ﬁrst NHS quality-
monitoring organization and the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE),
was to “promote clinical and cost effectiveness by producing clinical guidelines and au-
dits, for dissemination throughout the NHS” (Horton, 1999). By 1999, both CHI and
NICE were operating. However, ﬁve years after its establishment CHI was subsumed
by the Healthcare Commission, ofﬁcially the Commission for Healthcare Audit
and Inspection, CHAI (Health and Social Care (Community Health and Stan-
dards) Act ). CHAI was in existence for another ﬁve years until its responsibilities
were taken over by the CQC in 2009 (Health and Social Care Act, (Commence-
ment No. 9, Consequential Amendments and Transitory, Transitional and Saving
Provisions) Order 2009). Over the same period, NICE also saw changes with an
expansion of its original remit and changes to its formal title and status. In 2005
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it became the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence, having taken
over the public health functions after the Health Development Agency was
disbanded (Littlejohns and Kelly, 2005). Then, as part of the legislation enacting
the NHS reforms and having been given new responsibility to produce guidance in
social care, NICE was reconstituted as a non-departmental public body called the
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (Lancet, 2013). Throughout
these developments the institute retained the NICE acronym, reﬂecting the impor-
tance of its “brand recognition” (Morris, 2009). It is apparent that both were sub-
ject to political direction and organizational change. During this period NICE,
despite much public outcry over some of its decisions, has appeared to thrive
and develop an international reputation while successive quality-monitoring orga-
nizations have struggled to establish themselves. Even now the latest manifesta-
tion of the monitoring organization has received challenging reports from
government bodies (Public Accounts committee report into the CQC, 2015) and
criticism from professional bodies (Chief Inspector 2015).
From a political science perspective these quangos form the classical “agents” and
the Department of Health the “principal” in principal agent modeling, which has
dominated recent academic analysis of the relationship between bureaucracies and
elected ofﬁcials. Waterman and Meier have broadened the concept by creating a
dynamic framework based on their thesis that goal conﬂict and information
asymmetry (the main stays of principle agent theory) are not necessarily constant
(Waterman 1998).
In order to better understand the role of central government, and the relationship
with the quangos that were established to improve quality, we have undertaken a
two-stage investigation. We undertook a series of interviews with key players to
identify the key features relevant to a principle-agent model, and then using these
characteristics we mapped the institutions to the Waterman, Meier expanded model.
METHODS
Interview
We conducted an interview study using a conventional qualitative content analysis
approach (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). Our research approach comprised ﬁve main
elements: (i) unstructured data collection using open-ended interview questions;
(ii) multiple, independent data judges throughout data analysis; (iii) judges arriving
at consensus about the meaning of data; (iv) an auditor to check the work of the data
judges; and (v) an analysis that coded interview data into categories, provided a
description of each category and examined discrepancies across interviews.
Setting and participants
We used a purposive (expert-sampling) approach to identify individuals with
signiﬁcant expertise or experience at senior-management level in one or more of
the organizations involved in NHS standard-setting or quality-monitoring. Eleven
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expert informants (including senior managers in the relevant organizations) were
selected and invited by email to participate. All 11 agreed to participate and
completed their interviews in full. Our participants were:
• Professor Sir Michael Rawlins (Chairman of NICE, 1999–2012)
• Sir Andrew Dillon (Chief executive of NICE, 1999–present)
• Professor David Haslam (Chairman of NICE, 2013–present; Healthcare Commission:
National Clinical Adviser, 2005–2009; Care Quality Commission: National
Professional Adviser, 2009–2013)
• Professor Sir Ian Kennedy (Chairman of the Healthcare Commission, 2004–2009)
• Andy McKeon (Director General of Policy and Planning, Department of
Health, 2002; Managing Director, Health, Audit Commission, 2003–2012;
Non-executive Director of NICE, 2009–present)
• Dr. Linda Patterson (Medical Director of Commission for Health Improvement,
1999–2004)
• Dr. Peter Homa (Chief Executive of Commission for Health Improvement,
1999–2004)
• Andrea Sutcliffe (Deputy Chief Executive of NICE, 2001–2007; Chief Care
Inspector for Social Care, Care Quality Commission, 2013 – present)
• Professor Albert Weale (Professor of Political Theory and Public Policy at
University College London; Chair of the Nufﬁeld Council for Bioethics
2007–2012; Author of “Democratic Justice and the Social Contract”)
• Professor Sir Michael Richards (Chief Inspector of Hospitals Care Quality
Commission 2013–present)
• Cynthia Bower (Chief Executive of Care Quality Commission, 2009–2012)
Procedures
An experienced medical journalist (Polly Newton) conducted in-depth (unstructured)
face-to-face interviews in participants’ private ofﬁces. Interviews lasted 35–88min (mean
62min) and were recorded and transcribed verbatim. We did not use an interview sched-
ule. Interviewees were asked to talk in detail about their experience and reﬂections on
NHS quality-monitoring (with an emphasis on CHI, CHAI and CQC) and standard-
setting (with an emphasis on NICE). Participation was voluntary, and informed consent
was obtained. Eight of the 11 interviewees consented to their responses being attributable
to them. Our interviewees were also offered the opportunity to read and comment on their
interview transcripts and a draft copy of this paper prior to its submission for publication.
Data analysis
Three disinterested data judges (AK, AL and TLP) undertook conventional qualitative
content analysis to identify patterns of responses (categories) within and across inter-
views. The data judges worked independently to minimize the inﬂuence of individual
bias and to ensure that our analysis was rigorous and credible. The analysis comprised
four main stages. First, independent coding schemes were developed by each data
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judge (Stage 1). This involved each judge working fully independently to develop his
or her own summary of the interview data. The judges listened to all interview record-
ings and read each interview transcript repeatedly to become immersed in the data. The
judges then made detailed notes on each interview. These notes were condensed and
structured in an iterative process until each judge had developed his or her own sum-
mary (coding scheme) that was solely derived from the data. Judges then tested the cod-
ing schemes by checking them against the interview data to ensure that the categories
and sub-categories were appropriate, comprehensive and parsimonious.
Second, each coder took all of the three independent coding schemes, and
independently created a new coding scheme that incorporated all of the insights
from each coder (Stage 2). Third, the coders came together to discuss their
coding schemes, and agreed on a single composite coding scheme that captured
all of the insights from the individual coding schemes (Stage 3). After meeting to
discuss similarities and discrepancies in categories and structure, one judge (AK)
presented the composite coding scheme to the data auditor (PL). The auditor recom-
mended alterations to the coding scheme after examining the categories and their
deﬁnitions (Stage 4). The audited coding scheme was checked against the interview
data independently by each of the judges, who met again to discuss whether the cat-
egories were appropriate, comprehensive and parsimonious. This process continued
for six iterations until a ﬁnal coding scheme was developed that was endorsed by
each of the data judges and the auditor.
The three data judges independently applied the ﬁnal coding scheme to the
interview transcripts. Each judge coded every interview transcript independently
using the ﬁnal coding scheme. The judges then met to resolve discrepancies in their
codings through discussion. The output of this stage was full coding of each
interview transcript using the ﬁnal coding scheme. Sections of interview transcripts
were coded into multiple categories where necessary.
Principle agent modeling
The principal and agent theory emerged in the 1970s from the combined disciplines of
economics and institutional theory. The theory has been extended well beyond economics
or institutional studies to all contexts of information asymmetry, uncertainty and risk. The
principal-agent problem arises where the two parties have different interests and asymmet-
ric information (the agent having more information), such that the principal cannot di-
rectly ensure that the agent is always acting in its (the principal’s) best interests,
particularly when activities that are useful to the principal are costly to the agent, and
where elements of what the agent does are costly for the principal to observe. Moral haz-
ard and conﬂict of interest may arise. Indeed, the principal may be sufﬁciently concerned
at the possibility of being exploited by the agent that he chooses not to enter into a trans-
action at all, when that deal would have actually been in both parties’ best interests: a sub-
optimal outcome that lowers welfare overall. The deviation from the principal’s interest by
the agent is called “agency costs”. Various mechanisms may be used to align the interests
of the agent with those of the principal, including the threat of termination of employment.
TheWaterman andMeier approach challenges the assumption of normal principal-
agent modeling that goal conﬂicts and information asymmetry are constants. Using
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these as variables (instead of constants) creates eight states of principal agent interac-
tions. A description of these states (as presented in Waterman and Meier’s paper) and
what they mean for the principal agent interactions is provided in Figures 1 and 2. In
our study using the themes identiﬁed by the interviews it was possible to locate the
organizations within the Waterman and Meier framework and track their changing
position in the eight possible states over time.
RESULTS
Interviews
Figure 3 presents the results of the initial two rounds of independent content analysis
and then the two rounds of consensus content analysis. There was close concordance
throughout all the stages.
Figure 2. The Waterman and Meier expanded Principal-Agent model (ii) Goal Consensus
Figure 1. The Waterman and Meier expanded Principal-Agent model (i) Goal Conﬂict
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Ten overarching themes were identiﬁed as inﬂuencing the functioning of the NHS
regulatory institutions: Socio-political environment; Governance and accountability;
External relationships; Clarity of purpose; Organizational reputation; Leadership and
management; Organizational stability; Resources; Organizational methods; Organi-
zational performance. These are presented in the box together with a deﬁnition
and a synthesis of the range and nature of our interviewees’ responses relating to
these themes, together with illustrative quotations.
Locating institutions in principle agent model
Our interview study identiﬁed that goal conﬂict as described in the “clarity of
purpose” theme, and information asymmetry (guidance development and regulatory
methodology) as presented in the“ organizational methods” theme were key features
that dominated the nature of the relationship between the principal and agent
(see box and sections on clarity of purpose and organizational methods). The
relationships between the principals and the agents were not static and each organi-
zation could be tracked according to the eight states over time reﬂecting the various
permutations of goal conﬂict and information asymmetry (Figure 4). Furthermore
the other themes derived from the interviews help explain why the organization
could be located in the which particular state. CHI started with an obvious goal con-
ﬂict with the DH (see box and clarity of purpose theme) and as neither the agent nor
Figure 3. Flow diagram of the evolution of the themes from independent analyses to ﬁnal consensus
ENGLISH NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE
© 2016 The Authors. The International Journal of Health
Planning and Management Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. DOI: 10.1002/hpm
Int J Health Plann Mgmt 2016
principal had a clear understanding of the appropriate method of monitoring quality
(as determined by the interview responses) it started in state 1. It moved to state 2 as
CHI became clearer on the methodology it wished to use (see comments of Peter
Homa in organizational methods in box) but then moved to state 3 as the DH
increased its understanding of what it required. The differing views on the appropri-
ate method of regulation increased the goal conﬂict and became so dominant that the
principle DH created a new agent rather than continue to negotiate with CHI and it
was closed down. The Health Commission started at state 7 as there was a clear (but
perhaps only perceived) consensus on the goal and on methods of regulation.
However it moved to state 3 as the consensus was lost or it was realized had never
existed. The interviews suggest that this was also a function of other existing
principals other than the DH exerting inﬂuence and new principals being created.
It was reported that senior NHS management considered that the Health Commission
reports were unduly negative and damaging to the reputation of the NHS. The
involvement of new principals entering the regulatory arena brought their own set
of goals. The key new principal was Monitor established by the Treasury in order
to take on responsibility for monitoring the ﬁnancial viability of the emerging new
NHS structures. This led to confusion in the regulatory landscape and again resolu-
tion did not happen and the Health Commission was dissolved. A third quango CQC
was established. CQC started at state 7 as there was goal consensus and both agent
and principle had good knowledge of what information and methods were re-
quired. But its position moved to state 8 as CQC’s methodology was challenged
based on the publication of a series of independent reports highlighting the poor
quality of care in some NHS institutions that the CQC had considered were pro-
viding good care according to their methods. Their ability to respond to this crit-
icism was severely hampered as resources were not available because of the new
period of austerity (see Andrea Sutcliffe’s comments in box, resources theme).
More recently, post 2013, after the senior management team had been replaced
and new methods introduced (based on multi-professional inspection teams)
CQC has moved back to state 7. However this situation remains precarious as
its methods are resource intensive and may not be sustainable in the long term.
NICE started at state 6 as it had a monopoly on the knowledge of methods for
health technology assessment and guideline development and consensus with
the DH on its main goal which was to assess value for money. It remained there
for some time until new principals emerged, e.g. NHS England. Its position then
switched to state7 as the new principal NHS England considered that they were
as knowledgeable regarding methods. An example of this is when NHS England
produced guidance previously developed by NICE and in essence took on an
“agent” function. However there are also examples of classical policy subsystems
existing, e.g. the joint working between NICE and NHS England on the creation
of the new Cancer Drugs Fund (Littlejohns et al., 2016). However as new goals
for controlling NHS total cost (as opposed to assessing cost-effectiveness) became
important and the ﬁnancial crisis deepened goal conﬂict emerged and NICE’s po-
sition moved to state 3. So over time while starting from different positions, 3
quangos eventually ended up in state 3. Two just before they were closed down
and NICE is currently at 3.
P. LITTLEJOHNS ET AL.
© 2016 The Authors. The International Journal of Health
Planning and Management Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. DOI: 10.1002/hpm
Int J Health Plann Mgmt 2016
B
ox
.T
he
m
es
cr
ea
te
d
by
co
nt
en
t
an
al
ys
is
of
in
te
rv
ie
w
s
an
d
a
de
sc
ri
pt
io
n
of
th
ei
r
im
pa
ct
on
th
e
fu
nc
tio
ni
ng
of
th
e
qu
an
go
es
to
ge
th
er
w
ith
ill
us
tr
at
iv
e
qu
ot
at
io
ns
.
T
he
m
e
D
eﬁ
ni
tio
n
Im
pa
ct
on
N
IC
E
an
d
C
H
I,
H
ea
lth
C
om
m
is
si
on
an
d
C
Q
C
1.
S
oc
io
-
po
lit
ic
al
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t
O
ut
si
de
co
nd
iti
on
s
or
si
tu
at
io
ns
th
at
in
ﬂ
ue
nc
e
th
e
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
of
th
e
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n
(e
.g
.e
co
no
m
ic
co
nt
ex
t,
he
al
th
se
ct
or
co
nt
ex
t,
in
te
r-
or
ga
ni
za
tio
na
l
co
nt
ex
t,
et
c.
)
T
he
pe
ri
od
of
in
ve
st
ig
at
io
n
ca
n
be
di
vi
de
d
in
to
tw
o
ph
as
es
.T
he
ﬁ
rs
t
ph
as
e,
19
99
–2
00
7
w
itn
es
se
d
th
e
gr
ea
te
st
in
cr
ea
se
in
sp
en
di
ng
in
N
H
S
hi
st
or
y,
re
su
lti
ng
fr
om
th
e
an
no
un
ce
m
en
t
by
T
on
y
B
la
ir
du
ri
ng
a
w
ee
ke
nd
te
le
vi
si
on
in
te
rv
ie
w
th
at
th
e
U
K
w
ou
ld
ai
m
to
in
cr
ea
se
fu
nd
in
g
on
he
al
th
ca
re
un
til
it
m
at
ch
ed
th
e
E
ur
op
ea
n
av
er
ag
e.
T
hi
s
pe
ri
od
w
as
fo
llo
w
ed
by
th
e
lo
w
es
t
gr
ow
th
in
th
e
N
H
S
hi
st
or
y
as
a
re
su
lt
of
pu
bl
ic
se
ct
or
sa
vi
ng
s
in
re
sp
on
se
to
th
e
gl
ob
al
ﬁ
na
nc
ia
l
cr
is
is
.
In
th
e
ﬁ
rs
t
ph
as
e,
N
IC
E
fa
ce
d
pr
ob
le
m
s
as
it
w
as
re
je
ct
in
g
dr
ug
s
at
a
tim
e
of
ﬁ
na
nc
ia
l
in
ve
st
m
en
t
in
th
e
N
H
S
.I
n
th
e
se
co
nd
ph
as
e,
th
e
in
tr
od
uc
tio
n
of
au
st
er
ity
m
ea
su
re
s
by
th
e
in
co
m
in
g
co
al
iti
on
go
ve
rn
m
en
t
ha
d
a
di
re
ct
ef
fe
ct
on
th
e
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t
of
th
e
C
Q
C
.
T
he
re
w
er
e
tig
ht
co
nt
ro
ls
on
ap
po
in
tm
en
t
of
ne
w
st
af
f
at
a
tim
e
w
he
n
th
e
C
Q
C
w
as
ex
pe
ct
ed
to
ex
pa
nd
an
d
ta
ke
on
ex
te
ns
iv
e
ne
w
re
sp
on
si
bi
lit
ie
s.
N
IC
E
w
as
no
t
th
e
on
ly
N
H
S
st
an
da
rd
-s
et
te
r
du
ri
ng
th
is
pe
ri
od
.I
ni
tia
lly
,
th
er
e
w
er
e
a
ra
ng
e
of
or
ga
ni
za
tio
ns
w
ith
ov
er
la
pp
in
g
re
sp
on
si
bi
lit
ie
s
is
su
in
g
gu
id
an
ce
,s
et
tin
g
st
an
da
rd
s
an
d
ta
rg
et
s,
in
cl
ud
in
g
th
e
N
at
io
na
l
P
at
ie
nt
S
af
et
y
A
ge
nc
y,
th
e
M
od
er
ni
sa
tio
n
A
ge
nc
y,
th
e
N
at
io
na
l
S
er
vi
ce
F
ra
m
ew
or
ks
(l
ed
by
cl
in
ic
al
le
ad
er
s
fr
om
w
ith
in
th
e
D
ep
ar
tm
en
t
of
H
ea
lth
[D
H
])
,
as
w
el
l
as
ce
nt
ra
l
N
H
S
ta
rg
et
s
re
la
tin
g
to
w
ai
tin
g
tim
es
,a
nd
th
e
Q
ua
lit
y
O
ut
co
m
es
F
ra
m
ew
or
k
fo
r
ge
ne
ra
l
pr
ac
tit
io
ne
rs
.
E
xc
ep
t
fo
r
th
os
e
th
at
re
m
ai
n
di
re
ct
ly
m
an
ag
ed
by
th
e
D
H
an
d
N
H
S
E
ng
la
nd
,t
he
ot
he
r
or
ga
ni
za
tio
ns
ha
ve
no
w
la
rg
el
y
be
en
di
sb
an
de
d
as
pa
rt
of
th
e
“b
on
ﬁ
re
of
th
e
qu
an
go
s”
un
de
rt
ak
en
by
su
cc
es
si
ve
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
io
ns
.
1
3
(c
on
tin
ue
s)
ENGLISH NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE
© 2016 The Authors. The International Journal of Health
Planning and Management Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. DOI: 10.1002/hpm
Int J Health Plann Mgmt 2016
B
ox
(C
on
tin
ue
d)
T
he
m
e
D
eﬁ
ni
tio
n
Im
pa
ct
on
N
IC
E
an
d
C
H
I,
H
ea
lth
C
om
m
is
si
on
an
d
C
Q
C
2.
G
ov
er
na
nc
e
an
d
ac
co
un
ta
bi
lit
y
T
he
ex
te
nt
to
w
hi
ch
th
e
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n
is
su
pp
or
te
d
or
hi
nd
er
ed
in
ca
rr
yi
ng
ou
ti
ts
m
is
si
on
an
d
st
ra
te
gy
by
po
lit
ic
al
ag
en
da
an
d
le
ga
l
fr
am
ew
or
ks
N
IC
E
an
d
th
e
m
on
ito
ri
ng
bo
di
es
ha
d
ve
ry
di
ff
er
en
tr
el
at
io
ns
hi
ps
an
d
un
de
rs
ta
nd
in
g
w
ith
th
e
D
H
an
d
G
ov
er
nm
en
t
on
ho
w
th
ey
ﬁ
tte
d
in
to
th
e
N
H
S
go
ve
rn
an
ce
st
ru
ct
ur
es
.
L
in
da
P
at
te
rs
on
w
as
cl
in
ic
al
vi
ce
pr
es
id
en
t
of
th
e
R
oy
al
C
ol
le
ge
of
P
hy
si
ci
an
s
w
he
n
in
te
rv
ie
w
ed
,a
nd
w
as
th
e
m
ed
ic
al
di
re
ct
or
of
C
H
I
fr
om
its
in
ce
pt
io
n
un
til
its
ro
le
w
as
ta
ke
n
ov
er
by
th
e
H
ea
lth
ca
re
C
om
m
is
si
on
.S
he
ha
d
al
so
be
en
a
m
em
be
r
of
th
e
N
IC
E
ap
pr
ai
sa
l
co
m
m
itt
ee
.S
he
de
sc
ri
be
d
a
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p
w
he
re
bo
th
C
H
I
an
d
D
H
w
er
e
un
su
re
of
w
ha
t
to
ex
pe
ct
fr
om
ea
ch
ot
he
r.
W
hi
le
sh
e
be
lie
ve
s
th
at
C
H
I
st
ru
gg
le
d
in
iti
al
ly
to
“g
et
to
th
e
he
ar
t
of
w
ha
t
qu
al
ity
ca
re
w
as
ab
ou
t”
,s
he
is
al
so
ad
am
an
tt
ha
tt
he
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n
w
as
st
af
fe
d
by
a
hi
gh
ly
co
m
m
itt
ed
te
am
th
at
ha
d
be
gu
n
to
m
ak
e
an
im
pa
ct
an
d
w
ou
ld
ha
ve
go
ne
on
to
ac
hi
ev
e
si
gn
iﬁ
ca
nt
re
su
lts
.
E
ve
n
w
he
n
th
e
go
ve
rn
m
en
t
si
gn
al
le
d
its
in
te
nt
io
n
to
in
co
rp
or
at
e
an
au
di
t
fu
nc
tio
n
in
to
th
e
re
m
it
of
C
H
I
(p
re
vi
ou
sl
y
th
e
re
sp
on
si
bi
lit
y
of
N
IC
E
),
tu
rn
in
g
C
H
I
in
to
th
e
H
ea
lth
C
om
m
is
si
on
,
L
in
da
an
d
he
r
co
lle
ag
ue
s
fu
lly
ex
pe
ct
ed
to
co
nt
in
ue
th
e
w
or
k
th
ey
ha
d
be
gu
n
ra
th
er
th
an
ha
vi
ng
th
ei
r
co
nt
ra
ct
s
im
m
ed
ia
te
ly
te
rm
in
at
ed
,
“I
do
n’
tt
hi
nk
th
e
go
ve
rn
m
en
t
un
de
rs
to
od
th
at
w
e
re
al
ly
w
er
e
in
de
pe
nd
en
t.
Th
ey
th
ou
gh
tt
he
y
co
ul
d
ri
ng
us
up
an
d
te
ll
us
w
ha
tt
o
do
.T
he
re
w
as
al
so
pr
es
su
re
fo
r
a
qu
ic
k
ﬁ
x.
Th
ey
th
ou
gh
tw
e
w
er
e
ta
ki
ng
to
o
lo
ng
.T
he
y
w
an
te
d
re
su
lts
.T
he
y
be
ca
m
e
im
pa
tie
nt
,w
hi
ch
w
as
a
re
al
fa
ul
to
f
th
e
La
bo
ur
go
ve
rn
m
en
t”
…
“
It
[t
he
ne
w
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n]
w
as
na
m
ed
de
lib
er
at
el
y
to
so
un
d
th
e
sa
m
e
as
be
fo
re
.W
e
w
er
e
to
ld
‘t
he
re
’s
go
in
g
to
be
a
ch
an
ge
,i
t’s
a
le
gi
sl
at
iv
e
ch
an
ge
,w
e’
re
go
in
g
to
ha
ve
a
sl
ig
ht
ch
an
ge
of
na
m
e’
.A
nd
w
e
th
ou
gh
tw
e
w
er
e
ju
st
ca
rr
yi
ng
on
.W
e
w
er
e
ju
st
co
m
pl
et
el
y
ch
op
pe
d
of
f,
yo
u
kn
ow
.
W
e
ca
rr
ie
d
on
w
or
ki
ng
[u
nt
il
th
e
la
st
da
y]
.W
e
ha
d
th
is
re
al
(c
on
tin
ue
s)
P. LITTLEJOHNS ET AL.
© 2016 The Authors. The International Journal of Health
Planning and Management Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. DOI: 10.1002/hpm
Int J Health Plann Mgmt 2016
B
ox
(C
on
tin
ue
d)
T
he
m
e
D
eﬁ
ni
tio
n
Im
pa
ct
on
N
IC
E
an
d
C
H
I,
H
ea
lth
C
om
m
is
si
on
an
d
C
Q
C
co
m
m
itm
en
ta
nd
w
e
w
an
te
d
to
le
av
e
a
le
ga
cy
an
d
w
e
w
ro
te
qu
ite
a
lo
to
fl
eg
ac
y
do
cu
m
en
ts
to
sa
y
w
ha
tw
ou
ld
ha
ve
be
en
th
e
le
ar
ni
ng
ou
to
ft
hi
s,
th
at
an
d
th
e
ot
he
r.
A
nd
w
e
ca
rr
ie
d
on
de
liv
er
in
g,
as
I
sa
y,
I
re
m
em
be
r
do
in
g
th
is
bi
g
pi
ec
e
of
w
or
k
th
e
da
y
be
fo
re
I
le
ft”
…
[
A
si
m
ila
r
pi
ct
ur
e
w
as
pr
es
en
te
d
by
P
et
er
H
om
a,
“T
he
re
w
er
e
so
m
e
ea
rl
y
sk
ir
m
is
he
s.
I
re
m
em
be
r
th
at
on
e
of
th
e
sp
ec
ia
la
dv
is
er
s
w
ro
te
an
ar
tic
le
th
at
w
as
de
si
gn
ed
to
be
pu
bl
is
he
d
un
de
r
th
e
na
m
e
of
,I
th
in
k
it
w
as
D
ei
dr
e
H
in
e
(C
ha
ir
m
an
of
C
H
I)
,w
hi
ch
w
as
co
m
pl
et
el
y
di
ss
on
an
tw
ith
ei
th
er
w
ha
tw
e
ex
pe
ct
ed
to
do
or
ho
w
w
e
ex
pe
ct
ed
to
do
it.
A
nd
w
e
re
fu
se
d
to
pu
bl
is
h
th
e
th
in
g,
or
re
fu
se
d
to
en
do
rs
e
it,
w
hi
ch
di
dn
’t
go
do
w
n
ve
ry
w
el
la
tt
he
tim
e”
…
“
So
m
e
of
th
e
le
ss
se
ni
or
ci
vi
l
se
rv
an
ts
ha
d
ab
so
lu
te
ly
no
ex
pe
ri
en
ce
of
w
ha
tt
he
N
H
S
di
d
in
pr
ac
tic
e,
le
ta
lo
ne
ho
w
yo
u
cr
ea
te
d
an
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n
fr
om
sc
ra
tc
h.
A
nd
th
er
ef
or
e
w
e
of
te
n
ha
d
so
m
e
qu
ite
te
tc
hy
ex
ch
an
ge
s
w
ith
th
em
…
A
nd
th
e
ex
te
nt
to
w
hi
ch
th
ey
ca
n
un
de
rs
ta
nd
w
ha
ti
ti
s,
no
tj
us
tC
H
I,
bu
ta
ny
ot
he
r
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n
is
tr
yi
ng
to
do
is
ve
ry
,
ve
ry
im
po
rt
an
ta
s
ap
pe
ar
s
to
be
th
e
ca
se
no
w
in
te
rm
s
of
th
e
C
Q
C
,b
ec
au
se
th
e
do
ck
in
g
ar
ra
ng
em
en
ts
fo
r
th
e
D
ep
ar
tm
en
t
ap
pe
ar
to
be
fu
ll-
on
su
pp
or
ta
s
fa
r
as
I
ca
n
te
ll.
So
th
er
e
w
er
e
fr
is
so
ns
be
tw
ee
n
us
an
d
th
e
D
H
.T
he
[C
H
I]
co
m
m
is
si
on
an
d
co
m
m
is
si
on
er
s
w
er
e
ve
ry
cl
ea
r
w
ith
in
C
H
I
th
at
w
e
w
er
e
in
de
pe
nd
en
t.
O
bv
io
us
ly
w
e
tr
ie
d
to
do
ou
r
be
st
to
be
he
lp
fu
la
nd
su
pp
or
tiv
e,
bu
tt
ha
td
id
n’
tm
ea
n
th
at
w
ou
ld
so
fte
n
ou
r
re
po
rt
s.
A
nd
th
er
e
w
er
e
a
nu
m
be
r
of
oc
ca
si
on
s
w
he
n
th
e
N
H
S
w
an
te
d
us
to
so
fte
n
ou
r
re
po
rt
s,
an
d
of
te
n
so
m
e
qu
ite
se
ni
or
pe
op
le
in
th
e
St
ra
te
gi
c
H
ea
lth
A
ut
ho
ri
tie
s
an
d
w
e
w
er
e
sa
yi
ng
,‘
N
o,
th
an
k
yo
u
ve
ry
m
uc
h.
Th
es
e
ar
e
ou
r
ﬁ
nd
in
gs
,t
hi
s
is
w
ha
t
(c
on
tin
ue
s)
ENGLISH NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE
© 2016 The Authors. The International Journal of Health
Planning and Management Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. DOI: 10.1002/hpm
Int J Health Plann Mgmt 2016
B
ox
(C
on
tin
ue
d)
T
he
m
e
D
eﬁ
ni
tio
n
Im
pa
ct
on
N
IC
E
an
d
C
H
I,
H
ea
lth
C
om
m
is
si
on
an
d
C
Q
C
w
e’
re
sa
yi
ng
’.
O
ur
pr
im
ar
y
ob
lig
at
io
n
is
to
pa
tie
nt
s”
.
O
bv
io
us
ly
,w
e
w
er
e
co
nc
er
ne
d
to
m
ak
e
su
re
th
at
w
e
w
er
e
fa
ir
an
d
w
e
ga
ve
a
ba
la
nc
ed
ac
co
un
tw
he
re
th
at
w
as
ap
pr
op
ri
at
e”
.
A
si
m
ila
r
pi
ct
ur
e
w
as
pr
es
en
te
d
by
S
ir
Ia
n
K
en
ne
dy
w
ho
to
ok
ov
er
as
ch
ai
rm
an
of
th
e
H
ea
lth
C
om
m
is
si
on
.T
hi
s
le
ve
l
of
re
po
rt
ed
co
nﬂ
ic
tb
et
w
ee
n
th
e
qu
al
ity
-m
on
ito
rs
an
d
go
ve
rn
m
en
t
is
in
st
ar
k
co
nt
ra
st
to
th
e
ap
pa
re
nt
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p
be
tw
ee
n
th
e
D
H
an
d
N
IC
E
in
its
fo
rm
at
iv
e
ye
ar
s
“T
he
re
w
as
no
at
te
m
pt
at
al
lt
o
in
te
rf
er
e.
A
ct
ua
lly
m
in
is
te
rs
re
al
iz
ed
th
e
va
lu
e
of
ha
vi
ng
us
,a
s
it
w
er
e,
as
a
ﬁ
g
le
af
fo
r
th
em
,t
he
‘b
la
m
e
qu
an
go
’.
Th
ey
fo
un
d
th
at
ve
ry
us
ef
ul
.S
o
it
ge
nu
in
el
y
w
as
in
de
pe
nd
en
t”
,s
ay
s
S
ir
M
ic
ha
el
R
aw
lin
s.
H
ow
ev
er
,a
s
cu
rr
en
t
N
IC
E
ch
ai
r
D
av
id
H
as
la
m
po
in
te
d
ou
t,
it
is
pe
rh
ap
s
di
fﬁ
cu
lt
to
ju
dg
e
w
he
th
er
N
IC
E
w
as
le
ft
al
on
e
to
do
its
jo
b
be
ca
us
e
it
w
as
pe
rf
or
m
in
g
ef
fe
ct
iv
el
y
or
if
pe
rf
or
m
ed
ef
fe
ct
iv
el
y
be
ca
us
e
it
w
as
le
ft
al
on
e
to
do
its
jo
b.
E
ith
er
w
ay
,h
e
sa
id
,t
he
m
es
sa
ge
is
cl
ea
r:
“L
ea
ve
th
in
gs
al
on
e
an
d
th
ey
do
be
tte
r”
.
3.
E
xt
er
na
l
re
la
tio
ns
hi
ps
T
he
na
tu
re
an
d
qu
al
ity
of
re
la
tio
ns
hi
ps
be
tw
ee
n
th
e
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n
an
d
its
ex
te
rn
al
st
ak
eh
ol
de
rs
.
E
ng
ag
em
en
t
w
ith
ke
y
st
ak
eh
ol
de
rs
w
as
ci
te
d
as
an
im
po
rt
an
t
fa
ct
or
in
de
te
rm
in
in
g
th
e
pa
th
of
N
IC
E
an
d
th
e
re
gu
la
to
ry
in
st
itu
tio
ns
.N
IC
E
ga
rn
er
ed
su
pp
or
t
fr
om
m
an
y
of
th
e
ro
ya
l
m
ed
ic
al
co
lle
ge
s
an
d
fr
om
th
e
B
M
A
at
an
ea
rl
y
st
ag
e.
T
hi
s
in
cl
ud
ed
lo
ca
tin
g
th
e
N
at
io
na
l
C
ol
la
bo
ra
tin
g
C
en
tr
es
fo
r
th
e
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t
of
cl
in
ic
al
gu
id
el
in
es
w
ith
in
co
ns
or
tia
of
R
oy
al
C
ol
le
ge
s,
an
d
co
m
m
is
si
on
in
g
un
iv
er
si
ty
de
pa
rt
m
en
ts
to
pr
od
uc
e
ap
pr
ai
sa
l
re
po
rt
s
th
ro
ug
h
a
co
nt
ra
ct
w
ith
N
H
S
R
&
D
(w
hi
ch
la
te
r
be
ca
m
e
th
e
N
at
io
na
l
In
st
itu
te
fo
r
H
ea
lth
R
es
ea
rc
h)
.T
he
se
w
er
e
bo
th
fu
lly
fu
nd
ed
co
nt
ra
ct
ua
l
ar
ra
ng
em
en
ts
.I
n
co
nt
ra
st
,m
em
be
rs
of
N
IC
E
’s
ex
te
ns
iv
e
ra
ng
e
of
ad
vi
so
ry
co
m
m
itt
ee
s
w
er
e
no
t
re
im
bu
rs
ed
,
al
th
ou
gh
th
is
(c
on
tin
ue
s)
P. LITTLEJOHNS ET AL.
© 2016 The Authors. The International Journal of Health
Planning and Management Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. DOI: 10.1002/hpm
Int J Health Plann Mgmt 2016
B
ox
(C
on
tin
ue
d)
T
he
m
e
D
eﬁ
ni
tio
n
Im
pa
ct
on
N
IC
E
an
d
C
H
I,
H
ea
lth
C
om
m
is
si
on
an
d
C
Q
C
ne
ve
r
ca
us
ed
an
y
di
fﬁ
cu
lty
in
re
cr
ui
tin
g
hi
gh
qu
al
ity
pr
of
es
si
on
al
s.
H
ow
ev
er
,N
IC
E
fa
ce
d
co
ns
id
er
ab
le
re
si
st
an
ce
fr
om
th
e
st
ak
eh
ol
de
rs
—
no
ta
bl
y
fr
om
th
e
ph
ar
m
ac
eu
tic
al
in
du
st
ry
an
d
fr
om
pa
tie
nt
gr
ou
ps
—
w
ho
ob
je
ct
ed
to
so
m
e
of
its
de
ci
si
on
s
ab
ou
ts
pe
ci
ﬁ
c
dr
ug
tr
ea
tm
en
ts
.I
n
so
m
e
ca
se
s
th
e
tw
o
jo
in
ed
fo
rc
es
,s
ay
s
S
ir
M
ic
ha
el
R
aw
lin
s,
“F
or
a
tim
e,
so
m
e
ph
ar
m
ac
eu
tic
al
co
m
pa
ni
es
w
er
e
w
in
di
ng
up
pa
tie
nt
or
ga
ni
za
tio
ns
an
d
gi
vi
ng
th
em
pr
o
bo
no
P
R
he
lp
.W
he
n
I
di
sc
ov
er
ed
th
at
I
w
en
tv
er
y
pu
bl
ic
ab
ou
ti
ta
nd
I
ca
st
ig
at
ed
th
e
pa
tie
nt
or
ga
ni
za
tio
ns
th
at
w
er
e
do
in
g
it”
.I
n
co
nt
ra
st
,C
H
I
fo
un
d
di
fﬁ
cu
lty
in
ga
in
in
g
th
e
en
th
us
ia
sm
of
se
ni
or
cl
in
ic
ia
ns
.
L
in
da
P
at
te
rs
on
fe
lt
th
at
th
e
D
H
m
ad
e
in
su
fﬁ
ci
en
t
ef
fo
rt
to
fa
ci
lit
at
e
th
e
in
vo
lv
em
en
t
of
se
ni
or
cl
in
ic
ia
ns
an
d
m
an
ag
er
s
in
C
H
I’
s
in
sp
ec
tio
n
w
or
k.
S
ub
se
qu
en
t
m
on
ito
ri
ng
or
ga
ni
za
tio
ns
di
d
no
ts
ee
k
ex
te
ns
iv
e
se
ni
or
in
vo
lv
em
en
ta
ta
m
an
ag
er
ia
ll
ev
el
un
til
20
13
w
he
n
th
e
pr
im
e
m
in
is
te
r
an
no
un
ce
d
th
e
ap
po
in
tm
en
t
of
a
C
hi
ef
In
sp
ec
to
r
of
H
os
pi
ta
ls
fo
r
C
Q
C
an
d
la
te
r
pr
im
ar
y
ca
re
an
d
so
ci
al
ca
re
.
4.
C
la
ri
ty
of
pu
rp
os
e
T
he
ro
le
of
th
e
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n
as
st
at
ed
in
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
in
cl
ud
in
g
th
e
H
ea
lth
an
d
S
oc
ia
l
C
ar
e
A
ct
20
12
,
an
d
ho
w
th
e
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n
go
es
ab
ou
t
fu
lﬁ
lli
ng
th
at
ro
le
.
R
ig
ht
fr
om
th
e
st
ar
t“
N
IC
E
ha
d
a
cl
ea
r
in
te
lle
ct
ua
lp
ar
ad
ig
m
”
sa
ys
A
lb
er
t
W
ea
le
.T
he
ro
le
of
C
H
I
w
as
ba
se
d
on
m
uc
h
m
or
e
ne
bu
lo
us
cr
ite
ri
a,
sa
ys
fo
rm
er
D
H
di
re
ct
or
of
po
lic
y
an
d
pl
an
ni
ng
A
nd
y
M
cK
eo
n,
w
ho
w
as
in
st
ru
m
en
ta
l
in
dr
aw
in
g
up
th
e
19
97
w
hi
te
pa
pe
r,
“
w
ha
tm
in
is
te
rs
w
an
te
d
w
as
a
po
lic
em
an
;
w
ha
tt
he
y
go
tw
as
a
so
ci
al
w
or
ke
r”
.T
ha
t
un
ce
rt
ai
nt
y
ap
pe
ar
s
to
ha
ve
do
gg
ed
C
H
Ia
nd
its
su
cc
es
so
rs
ev
er
si
nc
e.
T
hi
s
m
ay
be
ex
pe
ct
ed
,a
s
th
e
da
y-
to
-d
ay
m
on
ito
ri
ng
of
qu
al
ity
in
th
e
w
ho
le
of
th
e
N
H
S
is
a
m
ag
ni
tu
de
la
rg
er
an
d
m
or
e
co
m
pl
ex
th
an
te
ch
no
lo
gy
as
se
ss
m
en
t
an
d
gu
id
an
ce (
co
nt
in
ue
s)
ENGLISH NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE
© 2016 The Authors. The International Journal of Health
Planning and Management Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. DOI: 10.1002/hpm
Int J Health Plann Mgmt 2016
B
ox
(C
on
tin
ue
d)
T
he
m
e
D
eﬁ
ni
tio
n
Im
pa
ct
on
N
IC
E
an
d
C
H
I,
H
ea
lth
C
om
m
is
si
on
an
d
C
Q
C
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t.
A
nu
m
be
r
of
in
te
rv
ie
w
ee
s
co
ns
id
er
ed
th
e
m
od
el
th
at
th
e
ce
nt
re
w
as
se
ek
in
g
to
de
ve
lo
p
w
as
an
ex
te
rn
al
re
gu
la
to
r
to
m
on
ito
r
th
e
qu
al
ity
of
a
w
ho
le
ra
ng
e
of
pu
bl
ic
an
d
pr
iv
at
e
pr
ov
id
er
s
re
qu
ir
ed
in
a
m
ix
ed
he
al
th
ec
on
om
y,
in
w
ha
t
R
ud
ol
f
K
le
in
ca
lle
d
a
“m
im
ic
m
ar
ke
t”
.1
4
5.
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l
re
pu
ta
tio
n
T
he
ov
er
al
l
es
tim
at
io
n
in
w
hi
ch
an
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n
is
he
ld
by
its
in
te
rn
al
an
d
ex
te
rn
al
st
ak
eh
ol
de
rs
ba
se
d
on
its
pa
st
ac
tio
ns
an
d
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
of
its
fu
tu
re
be
ha
vi
ou
r.
T
he
co
ns
ta
nt
re
st
ru
ct
ur
in
g,
ne
w
le
ad
er
s
an
d
no
ve
l
m
et
ho
do
lo
gi
es
m
ea
nt
th
at
no
si
ng
le
m
on
ito
ri
ng
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n
ev
er
ha
d
su
fﬁ
ci
en
t
tim
e
to
es
ta
bl
is
h
a
re
pu
ta
tio
n.
In
co
nt
ra
st
,
N
IC
E
co
nﬁ
rm
ed
its
pr
es
en
ce
as
a
“s
ig
ni
ﬁ
ca
nt
pl
ay
er
”
w
ith
its
ﬁ
rs
t
co
nt
ro
ve
rs
ia
l
de
ci
si
on
no
t
to
ap
pr
ov
e
R
el
en
za
be
in
g
re
ac
he
d
in
O
ct
ob
er
19
99
,o
nl
y
7
m
on
th
s
af
te
r
th
e
In
st
itu
te
w
as
es
ta
bl
is
he
d.
P
ar
ad
ox
ic
al
ly
,
N
IC
E
ha
s
no
t
ye
t
es
ta
bl
is
he
d
its
ap
pr
ai
sa
l
pr
oc
es
se
s
so
th
is
de
ci
si
on
w
as
m
ad
e
by
an
ad
ho
c
pr
oc
es
s
co
ns
is
tin
g
of
A
nd
re
w
D
ill
on
,
P
et
er
L
itt
le
jo
hn
s,
R
ay
T
al
lis
an
d
Jo
C
ol
lie
r.
W
hi
le
ea
rl
y
co
m
m
en
ts
fr
om
th
e
R
oy
al
C
ol
le
ge
s
w
er
e
w
ar
y
ab
ou
t
th
e
In
st
itu
te
th
ey
so
on
be
ca
m
e
st
ro
ng
ad
vo
ca
te
s
of
N
IC
E
an
d,
th
ro
ug
h
th
e
cr
ea
tio
n
of
th
e
na
tio
na
l
C
ol
la
bo
ra
tin
g
C
en
tr
es
,b
ec
am
e
th
e
m
aj
or
so
ur
ce
of
N
IC
E
cl
in
ic
al
gu
id
el
in
es
.
6.
L
ea
de
rs
hi
p
an
d
m
an
ag
em
en
t
L
ea
de
rs
hi
p
is
th
e
ab
ili
ty
of
se
ni
or
m
an
ag
er
s
to
in
ﬂ
ue
nc
e
ot
he
r
pe
op
le
to
gu
id
e,
st
ru
ct
ur
e
an
d
fa
ci
lit
at
e
ac
tiv
iti
es
an
d
re
la
tio
ns
hi
ps
.M
an
ag
em
en
t
is
th
e
ab
ili
ty
of
se
ni
or
m
an
ag
er
s
to
en
su
re
th
at
le
ad
er
sh
ip
go
al
s
ar
e
ac
hi
ev
ed
vi
a
su
pp
or
tin
g,
m
on
ito
ri
ng
,d
ir
ec
tin
g
an
d
m
ot
iv
at
in
g
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
.
T
he
co
ns
ta
nt
ch
an
gi
ng
of
th
e
qu
al
ity
-m
on
ito
ri
ng
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n
m
ea
nt
th
at
th
er
e
w
as
a
co
m
pl
et
e
ch
an
ge
in
se
ni
or
st
af
f
ap
pr
ox
im
at
el
y
ev
er
y
5
ye
ar
s.
D
es
pi
te
th
e
hi
gh
qu
al
ity
of
th
e
st
af
f,
ea
ch
ne
w
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n
ad
op
te
d
a
di
ff
er
en
t
m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
an
d
st
af
f
w
er
e
ch
os
en
ac
co
rd
in
gl
y.
T
he
ﬁ
rs
ta
pp
ro
ac
h
w
as
as
a
“s
up
po
rt
in
g”
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n,
he
ad
ed
by
a
se
ni
or
he
al
th
m
an
ag
er
an
d
se
ni
or
cl
in
ic
al
st
af
f.
T
he
se
co
nd
ap
pr
oa
ch
w
as
ba
se
d
on
m
on
ito
ri
ng
da
ta
an
d
it
w
as
co
ns
id
er
ed
ne
ce
ss
ar
y
to
ha
ve
N
H
S
m
an
ag
er
s
or
cl
in
ic
ia
ns
as
ad
vi
so
rs
ra
th
er
th
an
in
se
ni
or
m
an
ag
em
en
t
ro
le
s.
T
he
th
ir
d
ap
pr
oa
ch
w
as
ba
se
d
on (c
on
tin
ue
s)
P. LITTLEJOHNS ET AL.
© 2016 The Authors. The International Journal of Health
Planning and Management Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. DOI: 10.1002/hpm
Int J Health Plann Mgmt 2016
B
ox
(C
on
tin
ue
d)
T
he
m
e
D
eﬁ
ni
tio
n
Im
pa
ct
on
N
IC
E
an
d
C
H
I,
H
ea
lth
C
om
m
is
si
on
an
d
C
Q
C
re
gi
st
ra
tio
n
an
d
re
-i
nt
ro
du
ce
d
in
sp
ec
tio
ns
w
hi
le
ad
op
tin
g
a
m
an
ag
em
en
t
m
od
el
w
ith
he
al
th
m
an
ag
er
s
in
se
ni
or
po
st
s
w
ith
pr
of
es
si
on
al
ad
vi
so
rs
at
na
tio
na
l
lo
ca
l
le
ve
ls
.
A
ft
er
th
e
C
Q
C
ch
an
ge
d
its
m
et
ho
d
of
in
sp
ec
tio
ns
in
20
13
,
se
ni
or
cl
in
ic
al
pr
of
es
si
on
al
s
ag
ai
n
to
ok
ce
nt
re
st
ag
e
(i
.e
.c
hi
ef
in
sp
ec
to
rs
fo
r
ho
sp
ita
l,
pr
im
ar
y
ca
re
an
d
so
ci
al
ca
re
).
In
co
nt
ra
st
,t
he
N
IC
E
se
ni
or
te
am
w
as
re
m
ar
ka
bl
y
co
ns
ta
nt
7.
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l
st
ab
ili
ty
F
un
da
m
en
ta
li
nt
er
na
lo
r
ex
te
rn
al
al
te
ra
tio
ns
to
th
e
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n
or
its
ro
le
.
T
he
m
os
tc
om
m
on
ly
ci
te
d
ca
us
e
fo
r
th
e
de
le
te
ri
ou
s
ef
fe
ct
s
on
qu
al
ity
m
on
ito
ri
ng
w
as
or
ga
ni
za
tio
na
lc
ha
ng
e.
T
he
qu
al
ity
-
m
on
ito
ri
ng
qu
an
go
s
w
en
tt
ho
ug
h
m
an
y
po
lit
ic
al
ly
in
iti
at
ed
or
ga
ni
za
tio
na
lc
ha
ng
es
th
at
im
pa
ct
ed
on
th
e
w
ay
it
de
liv
er
ed
its
fu
nc
tio
n.
T
he
in
he
re
nt
di
fﬁ
cu
lty
of
qu
al
ity
im
pr
ov
em
en
ta
nd
its
m
on
ito
ri
ng
is
co
m
po
un
de
d
by
th
e
fa
ct
th
at
,n
o
m
at
te
rh
ow
go
od
a
he
al
th
ca
re
sy
st
em
is
,h
ig
h-
pr
oﬁ
le
di
sa
st
er
s
w
ill
in
ev
ita
bl
y
oc
cu
r.
W
he
n
th
ey
oc
cu
r
th
ey
cr
ea
te
tr
em
en
do
us
po
lit
ic
al
pr
es
su
re
to
ch
an
ge
th
e
le
ad
er
sh
ip
an
d
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
of
w
ha
te
ve
r
in
st
itu
tio
n
is
in
vo
lv
ed
in
th
e
pr
oc
es
s.
N
IC
E
al
so
ha
d
m
an
y
ch
an
ge
s
to
its
ro
le
an
d
fu
nc
tio
ns
(c
ha
ng
in
g
its
na
m
e
3
tim
es
)b
ut
w
as
ab
le
to
ad
ap
ta
nd
re
sp
on
d
to
its
ne
w
re
sp
on
si
bi
lit
ie
s.
H
ow
ev
er
,N
IC
E
di
d
no
tt
ak
e
on
al
lp
ot
en
tia
ln
ew
fu
nc
tio
ns
.F
or
ex
am
pl
e,
di
sc
us
si
on
s
on
pa
tie
nt
sa
fe
ty
co
nt
in
ue
d
un
til
th
e
N
at
io
na
lP
at
ie
nt
S
af
et
y
A
ge
nc
y
w
as
cl
os
ed
do
w
n
an
d
th
e
fu
nc
tio
n
ab
so
rb
ed
by
N
H
S
E
ng
la
nd
.F
ur
th
er
m
or
e,
de
sp
ite
m
an
y
di
sc
us
si
on
s
w
ith
th
e
D
H
on
th
e
U
K
sc
re
en
in
g
pr
og
ra
m
m
e
an
d
th
e
im
m
un
iz
at
io
n
an
d
va
cc
in
at
io
n
pr
og
ra
m
m
es
,t
he
se
pr
og
ra
m
m
es
re
m
ai
ne
d
w
ith
in
th
e
D
H
.A
st
ro
ng
fe
at
ur
e
w
as
th
at
N
IC
E
ha
d
de
ve
lo
pe
d
a
ge
ne
ri
c
w
ay
of
w
or
ki
ng
,a
nd
a
se
to
f
(c
on
tin
ue
s)
ENGLISH NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE
© 2016 The Authors. The International Journal of Health
Planning and Management Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. DOI: 10.1002/hpm
Int J Health Plann Mgmt 2016
B
ox
(C
on
tin
ue
d)
T
he
m
e
D
eﬁ
ni
tio
n
Im
pa
ct
on
N
IC
E
an
d
C
H
I,
H
ea
lth
C
om
m
is
si
on
an
d
C
Q
C
pr
in
ci
pl
es
an
d
m
od
e
of
w
or
ki
ng
th
at
co
ul
d
be
ap
pl
ie
d
(i
n
va
ri
ou
s
fo
rm
s)
to
al
ln
ew
co
m
m
is
si
on
s.
8.
R
es
ou
rc
es
S
to
ck
s
or
re
se
rv
es
of
m
on
ey
,m
at
er
ia
ls
,p
eo
pl
e
or
ot
he
r
as
se
ts
,
w
hi
ch
ca
n
be
dr
aw
n
on
by
th
e
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n
w
he
n
re
qu
ir
ed
.
N
IC
E
pr
es
en
te
d
a
ve
ry
cl
ea
r
m
es
sa
ge
to
th
e
D
H
th
at
an
y
ne
w
w
or
k
re
qu
ir
ed
ne
w
fu
nd
in
g,
an
d
a
re
al
is
tic
bu
si
ne
ss
ca
se
w
as
al
w
ay
s
pr
ep
ar
ed
.
T
he
ch
an
gi
ng
na
tu
re
of
th
e
qu
al
ity
-
m
on
ito
ri
ng
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n
(w
hi
ch
al
w
ay
s
in
vo
lv
ed
m
er
gi
ng
of
a
ra
ng
e
of
ex
is
tin
g
or
ga
ni
za
tio
ns
)
m
ea
nt
th
at
th
is
w
as
al
w
ay
s
go
in
g
to
be
ve
ry
di
fﬁ
cu
lt.
T
he
cl
im
ax
of
th
e
re
so
ur
ci
ng
cr
is
is
ca
m
e
w
he
n
th
e
ne
w
C
Q
C
w
as
gi
ve
n
a
hu
ge
ly
ex
pa
nd
ed
re
gi
st
ra
tio
n
br
ie
f,
at
th
e
sa
m
e
tim
e
as
ne
w
ap
po
in
tm
en
ts
w
er
e
fr
oz
en
in
th
e
w
ak
e
of
au
st
er
ity
m
ea
su
re
s,
“A
tt
ha
ts
ta
ge
C
Q
C
w
as
ef
fe
ct
iv
el
y
gi
ve
n
a
vi
rt
ua
lly
im
po
ss
ib
le
jo
b.
It
w
as
as
ke
d
to
m
er
ge
th
re
e
or
ga
ni
za
tio
ns
of
ve
ry
di
ffe
re
nt
ba
ck
gr
ou
nd
s
an
d
tr
ad
iti
on
s,
ve
ry
di
ffe
re
nt
cu
ltu
re
s
an
d
ve
ry
di
ffe
re
nt
w
ay
s
of
w
or
ki
ng
,i
nt
o
on
e.
Th
at
’s
di
fﬁ
cu
lt
en
ou
gh
.B
ut
it
w
as
al
so
as
ke
d
to
ta
ke
on
a
w
ho
le
ne
w
w
ay
of
re
gu
la
tio
n
an
d
re
gi
st
er
pr
ov
id
er
s
in
on
e
fe
ll
sw
oo
p.
A
tt
he
sa
m
e
tim
e
as
th
e
m
on
ey
st
ar
te
d
ge
tti
ng
ve
ry
,v
er
y
tig
ht
.A
nd
so
,n
ot
on
ly
di
d
th
at
m
ea
n
th
at
th
e
m
on
ey
w
as
ge
tti
ng
tig
ht
,b
ut
pe
op
le
’s
ex
pe
ct
at
io
ns
of
w
ha
ty
ou
w
ou
ld
do
w
ith
th
e
m
on
ey
w
er
e
go
in
g
hi
gh
er
.A
ll
of
th
at
w
as
ki
nd
of
ha
pp
en
in
g
at
th
e
tim
e
th
at
C
Q
C
w
as
be
in
g
as
ke
d
to
do
an
im
po
ss
ib
le
jo
b”
,s
ay
s
A
nd
re
a
S
ut
cl
if
fe
.
9.
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l
m
et
ho
ds
T
he
re
lia
bi
lit
y,
va
lid
ity
an
d
co
m
pr
eh
en
si
ve
ne
ss
of
th
e
pr
oc
es
se
s
th
at
ar
e
us
ed
by
th
e
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n
to
ge
ne
ra
te
its
pr
od
uc
ts
or
ou
tp
ut
s.
M
et
ho
ds
pr
ob
ab
ly
re
ﬂ
ec
t
th
e
bi
gg
es
t
di
ff
er
en
ce
s
be
tw
ee
n
th
e
tw
o
fu
nc
tio
ns
.N
IC
E
in
its
ap
pr
ai
sa
la
nd
gu
id
el
in
e
pr
og
ra
m
m
es
w
as
bu
ild
in
g
on
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l
co
ns
en
su
s
on
te
ch
ni
ca
l
m
et
ho
ds
,
an
d
an
ev
id
en
ce
ba
se
an
d
ro
bu
st
pr
oc
es
se
s
on
w
hi
ch
to
de
liv
er
th
em
.I
n
ad
di
tio
n,
N
IC
E
ha
rn
es
se
d
th
e
ex
pe
rt
is
e
of
th
e
N
H
S
,
th
e
R
oy
al
C
ol
le
ge
s
an
d
th
e
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
se
ct
or
.N
IC
E
so
ug
ht
no
t
to
pr
od
uc
e
gu
id
an
ce
its
el
f,
bu
t
to
de
si
gn
an
d
qu
al
ity
-a
ss
ur
e
(c
on
tin
ue
s)
P. LITTLEJOHNS ET AL.
© 2016 The Authors. The International Journal of Health
Planning and Management Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. DOI: 10.1002/hpm
Int J Health Plann Mgmt 2016
B
ox
(C
on
tin
ue
d)
T
he
m
e
D
eﬁ
ni
tio
n
Im
pa
ct
on
N
IC
E
an
d
C
H
I,
H
ea
lth
C
om
m
is
si
on
an
d
C
Q
C
pr
oc
es
se
s
w
he
re
in
de
pe
nd
en
t
ad
vi
so
ry
bo
di
es
de
ve
lo
pe
d
th
e
gu
id
an
ce
.N
IC
E
to
ok
re
sp
on
si
bi
lit
y
to
is
su
e
th
e
ﬁ
na
l
re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
ns
to
pr
ot
ec
t
th
ei
r
ad
vi
so
rs
fr
om
in
cr
im
in
at
io
n
fr
om
di
sg
ru
nt
le
d
st
ak
eh
ol
de
rs
.T
he
m
on
ito
ri
ng
or
ga
ni
za
tio
ns
ad
op
te
d
di
ff
er
in
g
ap
pr
oa
ch
es
re
ﬂ
ec
tin
g
a
la
ck
of
co
ns
en
su
s
on
ho
w
qu
al
ity
sh
ou
ld
be
as
se
ss
ed
an
d
re
gu
la
te
d.
“…
Th
e
ta
sk
w
e
ha
d
w
as
re
al
ly
bo
th
im
po
rt
an
tb
ut
ve
ry
to
ug
h,
no
tl
ea
st
be
ca
us
e
w
e
w
er
e
se
rv
in
g
tw
o
co
un
tr
ie
s,
E
ng
la
nd
an
d
W
al
es
.A
nd
w
e
ha
d
to
in
ve
nt
[t
he
m
et
ho
ds
],
it
w
as
a
bi
tl
ik
e
bu
ild
in
g
a
pl
an
e
w
hi
ls
tﬂ
yi
ng
it,
be
ca
us
e
w
e
ha
d
to
as
se
m
bl
e,
w
ith
in
a
ve
ry
sh
or
t
pe
ri
od
of
tim
e,
th
e
in
sp
ec
tio
n
m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
.A
nd
th
en
w
e
ha
d,
un
de
r
ve
ry
co
ns
id
er
ab
le
pr
es
su
re
fr
om
th
e
D
H
,t
o
de
liv
er
co
m
pr
eh
en
si
ve
co
ve
ra
ge
of
th
e
in
sp
ec
tio
ns
ac
ro
ss
th
e
N
H
S,
an
d
w
e
w
er
e
al
w
ay
s
ve
ry
ex
er
ci
se
d
ab
ou
tm
ak
in
g
su
re
w
e
di
dn
’t
pr
oc
ee
d
so
fa
st
w
e
m
ad
e
er
ro
rs
,a
nd
sa
y
so
m
et
hi
ng
w
as
sa
fe
w
he
n
it
w
as
n’
t”
,s
ay
s
P
et
er
H
om
a
10
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
T
he
qu
al
ity
of
an
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n’
s
pr
od
uc
ts
an
d
ou
tp
ut
s,
an
d
st
ak
eh
ol
de
rs
’
sa
tis
fa
ct
io
n
w
ith
th
os
e
pr
od
uc
ts
or
ou
tp
ut
s.
D
es
pi
te
co
nt
ro
ve
rs
ia
l
de
ci
si
on
s,
N
IC
E
’s
ou
tp
ut
s
an
d
pr
oc
es
se
s
be
ca
m
e
hi
gh
ly
re
ga
rd
ed
,o
ft
en
m
or
e
ov
er
se
as
th
an
in
th
e
U
K
.
T
hi
s
w
as
us
ef
ul
to
m
ai
nt
ai
n
go
ve
rn
m
en
t
su
pp
or
t,
as
m
in
is
te
rs
w
er
e
co
ns
ta
nt
ly
be
in
g
re
m
in
de
d
by
ot
he
r
co
un
tr
ie
s
of
th
e
va
lu
e
of
N
IC
E
.N
IC
E
re
m
ai
ne
d
th
ic
k-
sk
in
ne
d
to
do
m
es
tic
cr
iti
ci
sm
s,
an
d
w
as
w
ill
in
g
to
ex
pl
ai
n
its
de
ci
si
on
s.
It
al
w
ay
s
ﬁ
el
de
d
sp
ea
ke
rs
at
co
nf
er
en
ce
s
to
w
hi
ch
it
w
as
in
vi
te
d,
an
d
on
ra
di
o
an
d
T
V
pr
og
ra
m
m
es
ex
pl
or
in
g
its
de
ci
si
on
s.
T
hi
s
al
lo
w
ed
a
bu
ild
-u
p
of
ra
pp
or
tw
ith
th
e
m
ed
ia
th
at
al
lo
w
ed
co
m
pl
ex
is
su
es
to
be
ex
pl
or
ed
.
In
co
nt
ra
st
,
th
e
qu
al
ity
-m
on
ito
ri
ng
or
ga
ni
za
tio
ns
ha
d
di
fﬁ
cu
lty
in
ac
hi
ev
in
g
th
is
co
nt
in
ui
ty
an
d,
pa
ra
do
xi
ca
lly
,i
n
th
e
en
d
w
as
of
te
n
m
or
e
cr
iti
ci
ze
d
th
an
th
e
fa
ili
ng
ho
sp
ita
l
on
w
hi
ch
it
w
as
re
po
rt
in
g.
ENGLISH NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE
© 2016 The Authors. The International Journal of Health
Planning and Management Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. DOI: 10.1002/hpm
Int J Health Plann Mgmt 2016
DISCUSSION
Making sense of health policy decisions and assessing their impact on the quality of
health care are notoriously difﬁcult. Our results suggest a series of interrelated
factors affected the functioning of standard-setting and the quality-monitoring
organizations. Our interviewees described different patterns of characteristics and
internal/external relationships between NICE, the quality-monitoring organizations,
and the NHS and the Department of Health, which they believed were directly
associated with the functioning and success of the organizations. None of these will
be a surprise to those working in the ﬁeld, but two features stand out. The ﬁrst
feature is political inﬂuence. It is inevitable with a national health system directly
funded through taxation, and which is at the heart of the politics of a country, that
politicians will want signiﬁcant control. This can lead to goal conﬂict. Our ﬁndings
suggest that this had a profound effect on the ability of the NHS to monitor the
quality it is providing. The second feature is that clear methodology based on best
evidence (both technical and organizational) led by stable professional leadership
(clinical and managerial) can help NHS institutions to deliver on their remits, or at
least extend their time of functioning, even within a ﬁckle and changing political
environment. It is not possible to be absolutely certain how these themes link
together, although it is plausible to postulate that one summation could be that
differing policy objectives between the Department of Health and other government
Figure 4. Application of expanded Principal-Agent models to standing-setting and monitoring
in the NHS
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agencies and those responsible for monitoring NHS quality (Theme 2 and 4) resulted
in central involvement and organizational change (Theme 7). This had a disruptive
effect on the ability of the NHS to monitor quality. However constant professional
leadership, both clinical and managerial (Theme 6) and basing decisions on best
evidence, both technical and organizational (Theme 9) helped the function to be
delivered, even within a changing political/policy environment (Theme 1).
Application of the Waterman Meier framework enabled an understanding and
description of the dynamic relationship between central government and quangos in
the NHS and may predict when tensions will arise in the future. The study data collec-
tion ﬁnished in 2013 but it is still possible to track the institutions. The development of
the cancer drugs fund represented a deﬁnite goal conﬂict between the DH and NICE
(Littlejohns 2016). Furthermore the establishment of NHS England and Public Heath
England represents the entry of new principles in the health landscape and examples
of how this relationship is likely to develop can be demonstrated by a range of new
decisions, e.g. the termination of the “stafﬁng guidance” that was originally commis-
sioned fromNICE byNHS England (National Institute for Health and Care Excellence,
2015). This reﬂects a new goal conﬂict as cost savings dominate the NHS England
agenda rather than cost-effective guidance based on best evidence. On the other hand
the continuing debate between the government and junior doctors over pay and work
patterns shows what can happen when no recognized intermediary quango exists and
the challenge of having no agent in place.
NICE and the quality-monitoring organizations have received much media cover-
age since 1999. However, media coverage has often been distorted by limited access
to a wide sample of senior managerial voices, political or journalistic biases, and a
restricted or short-term outlook. This is the ﬁrst scientiﬁc study to capture insights
on standard-setting and quality-monitoring in the NHS though the experiences of
key players at the institutions established to deliver them. We have attempted to an-
alyze our interview data systematically and in an unbiased way and apply a political
paradigm. A key strength of the study was the candidness and honesty of the inter-
viewees, who clearly welcomed the opportunity to be involved in this study and to
have their position represented in an academic report. A potential limitation of the
study is that we did not sample every individual in a senior management position
in quality-monitoring and standard-setting organizations. By asking those directly
involved, we will obviously only get part of the picture, but is a legitimate approach
to narrative research (Greenhalgh et al., 2005). Indeed, there are probably as many
takes on the “truth of the matter” as there are key players, and yet common themes
did emerge from the data. We mitigated the potential criticism of researcher reﬂex-
ivity in two ways. First we employed an independent journalist to conduct unstruc-
tured interviews with no pre-determined questions or interview schedule. Second,
we ensured that PL’s past experience working at NICE did not contaminate our data
analysis by employing three disinterested data judges to conduct the analysis. In
these ways we ensured that the results could not be a simple reﬂection of the ques-
tions that were asked, or the research team’s prior knowledge or experience.
While the Lansley reforms were supposed to distance politicians from the day to
day functioning of the NHS, recent developments around stafﬁng and 7 day working
have returned politics right at the heart of health care provision. Having a framework
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with which to explore this relationship in a robust and dispassionate way will be use-
ful. We have shown that principle agent modeling describes and may predict how
future relationships occur between key players and could be useful in minimizing
some of the damaging extreme positions that can be taken.
While our study was undertaken in England, the ﬁndings may be of interest to
other countries seeking to improve quality of care through central directives.
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